The altered history in "A Single Inch" (three)

  "Distorting History in 'A Foot of Mountain and River, A Foot of Blood'" [Repost from Tiexue Forum]

  hcxy2000's words before reposting: ?

  It's a pity that due to certain reasons, there has already been debate in the book review about the contributions of the KMT and CPC during the War of Resistance. The author's point is very clear: among the people who resisted Japan, there were only Chinese, only descendants of the Huaxia nation, with no distinction between political parties!

  To fight a war of resistance, it is necessary to strengthen oneself. With [**] Chairman at the helm, the [**] people seized the opportunity, and history and the people chose the [**] people!

  Always remember, it is history and the people who have chosen [**]!

  This article is what the author saw on the Tiexue Forum. The vast majority of views in it I agree with. These views can fully answer the questions that the KMT has been complaining about recently.

  For the above reasons, please be prepared to re-post about this debate content reader note. If your point of view has been refuted in this post, I will not hesitate to delete your book review.

  Once again, I agree with most of the views in this article, but not all of them.

  This article comes from Tiexue Forum, thanks to the re-poster Anyitian.

  Episode 19: "Mid-term Resistance War"

  On November 25, 1938, Chairman Chiang of the Military Commission convened a military meeting at Nanyue. From the perspective of strategy and politics, he divided the war against Japan into two stages. The first stage started from the battles of Lugou Bridge, Songhu, Xuzhou, Wuhan to the fall of Yueyang. And the upcoming battle was designated as the second stage.

  Chiang Kai-shek said confidently: "The second phase of the war is when we turn defense into offense, and defeat into victory..." He pointed out at the meeting that the reason why the Japanese army could not immediately launch an attack on Changsha and Nanchang after capturing Wuhan was: "This is not because they did not think about this move in their strategy, but in fact, their strength has been exhausted... This fact can prove that the enemy cannot eliminate us, but instead proves that we can defeat the enemy's invasion."

  "On Protracted War" May 26, 1938

  Since the Sino-Japanese war is a protracted war, and the final victory will belong to China, it can be reasonably assumed that this protracted war will specifically manifest in three stages. The first stage is the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defense. The second stage is the period of the enemy's strategic conservation and our preparation for counterattack. The third stage is the period of our strategic counterattack and the enemy's strategic retreat. The specific situation of the three stages cannot be predicted, but based on current conditions, some major trends in the war can be pointed out. The course of objective reality will be extremely rich and changeable, and no one can create a "calendar" for the Sino-Japanese war; however, outlining a framework for the trend of the war is necessary for strategic guidance.

  The first stage has not yet been completed. ... In this stage, the form of warfare I adopted was mainly mobile warfare, with guerrilla warfare and positional warfare as supplements. Although positional warfare was in the first period of this stage, due to the subjective errors of the Nationalist Party's military authorities, it was placed in a primary position, but from the perspective of the entire stage, it is still supplementary.

  The second stage can be called the strategic stalemate stage. At the end of the first stage, due to the enemy's insufficient military strength and our strong resistance, the enemy will have to decide on a certain limit for their strategic offensive, and after reaching this limit, they will stop their strategic offensive and enter a defensive phase of occupying territory. In this stage, the enemy's plan is to defend the occupied territory, using deceitful methods to organize puppet governments, and plunder as much as possible from the Chinese people. However, in front of them, they will still face fierce guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, which developed extensively in the first stage by taking advantage of the emptiness behind enemy lines, will establish many base areas, basically threatening the enemy's defensive positions in occupied territory. Therefore, there will be a wide range of warfare in this second stage as well. In this stage, our main form of combat is guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. ... This war will be cruel, and localities will suffer severe destruction. However, if guerrilla warfare can succeed and do well, it may allow the enemy to only defend one-third of the occupied territory, while two-thirds will still be ours, which would be a great defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. At that time, the entire occupied territory will be divided into three types of regions:

  The first is the enemy's base area

  The second is the base of guerrilla warfare

  The third is the guerrilla zone disputed by both sides.

  The length of time for this stage will depend on the degree to which the strengths of both sides increase or decrease and how the international situation changes. Generally, we must prepare to pay a relatively long price and endure this difficult journey. This will be a very painful period for China, with economic difficulties and Han traitors causing trouble being two major problems.

  This second stage is the transitional phase of the entire war and will also be the most difficult period. However, it is the turning point. Whether China becomes an independent country or falls into colonialism does not depend on whether the big cities are lost in the first stage, but rather depends on the degree to which the whole nation makes an effort in the second stage.

  If we can persist in resisting the war, persist in the united front and persist in a protracted war, China will gain the strength to turn weakness into power during this stage. This is the second act of China's three-act play of resistance against Japan. With the efforts of all actors, the most brilliant finale can be performed well.

  The third stage is the counterattack phase of recovering lost territory. The recovery of lost territory mainly relies on China's own strength prepared in the previous stages and continuing to grow in this stage. In this stage, the war will no longer be a strategic defense but will become a strategic counterattack, and in appearance, it will manifest as a strategic offensive; it will no longer be a strategic interior line but will gradually become a strategic exterior line. Only when we fight our way to the Yalu River can we consider this war ended. The third stage is the final stage of the protracted war, and what is called persevering in the war to the end means going through the entire course of this stage. In this stage, the main form of warfare I will adopt will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will assume an important position.

  It seems that the protracted nature of war and its attendant cruelty are obvious. The enemy cannot swallow China whole, but can occupy many parts of China for a considerable period. China cannot quickly drive out the Japanese, but most of the land will still be China's. In the end it is the enemy who will be defeated and we who will be victorious, but we must go through a process of difficulty.

  Mr. [**] pointed out in his conversation with American journalist Mr. Snow on July 16, 1936:

  Our strategic policy should be to use our main force in a long, shifting and variable battle line. For the middle [**] team to win, it must conduct high-intensity mobile warfare on a vast battlefield, advancing quickly and retreating quickly, concentrating quickly and dispersing quickly. This is large-scale mobile warfare, not positional warfare that relies solely on defense works with deep trenches and layered defenses.

  This does not mean giving up all important military positions, for these positions, as long as they are advantageous, should be configured for positional warfare. However, the strategic guideline that transforms the overall situation must necessarily be mobile warfare. Positional warfare is also necessary, but it belongs to the secondary guideline of auxiliary nature. Geographically, with such a vast battlefield, we can make the most effective mobile warfare possible.

  If we concentrate our forces on a small battlefield to wage a war of attrition, it will cause our army to lose the advantageous conditions in geography and economic organization, making the same mistake as Abyssinia. In the early stages of the war, we should avoid all major decisive battles and first use mobile warfare to gradually destroy the enemy's morale and combat effectiveness.

  During the war, China was able to capture many Japanese soldiers and seize a large amount of weapons and ammunition to arm itself; at the same time, it sought foreign aid, gradually strengthening the equipment of its troops. As a result, China was able to engage in positional warfare in the later stages of the war, launching positional attacks on Japanese-occupied territories.

  Japan's economy is on the verge of collapse under the long-term strain of China's resistance war; its morale is also declining due to the endless wars. On the Chinese side, the potential for resistance is growing day by day, with large numbers of revolutionary masses pouring into the front lines to fight for independence. All these factors and others have combined to enable us to launch a final, decisive attack on Japan's strongholds and bases, driving the Japanese invasion army out of China.

  Mr. [**] divides the anti-Japanese war into three stages: defense, stalemate and counterattack.

  And pointed out: ?

  The first stage should take mobile warfare as the main form, with guerrilla warfare and positional warfare as supplements.

  This strategy was undoubtedly correct and was verified in 1946-1947. Unfortunately, [**] with his qualities, was unable to implement such a strategy.

  The second phase of the war will mainly be guerrilla warfare, with mobile warfare as a supplement. Mr. [**] said "We must get through this difficult period. This will be a very painful time for China, economic difficulties and Han Jian's sabotage will be two major problems."

  The third stage is the counter-offensive phase of recovering lost territory. The main form of warfare adopted in this stage will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will be given prominence.

  From the division of the war phase; strategic principles and tactical guidance for each stage; as well as the severe difficulties and problems that will be encountered, made a high-sighted judgment. Now we re-read "On Protracted War", we can find that the development of history is surprisingly similar to [**]'s judgment at the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War in many aspects. This is where the great man shines, in comparison, Mr. Chiang's light is much dimmer.

  Here, we should also see a point. [**] emphasized that the main factor in defeating Japanese aggression is: "China's own strength, which has been prepared in the previous stage and continues to grow in this stage". He saw the factor of victory as China itself, relying on its own strength to defeat Japanese aggressors. This forms a sharp contrast with the Nationalist Party, which relies almost entirely on foreign power and does not believe that China can win independently.

  "When two countries are at war, the aspects involved are profound and extensive. The actions, phenomena, and even the outcome of the battle can only be described as the tip of an iceberg. So what lies beneath the surface, hidden from view? Now, let's take a look at the situation of a country after the initial stage of resistance from several different perspectives."

  1. Economic plight. The national government lost the coastal cities and customs, with revenue reduced by more than half. However, expenditures increased sharply, first military spending to maintain 140 million people, and second education.

  2. Let's look at diplomacy again. "We will look at it from the perspective of international relations again. The Sino-Japanese War is by no means an isolated event in the world... We have been constantly striving to gain sympathy and support from our international friends, but what we get is only chilling."

  "Britain, not to mention. In the 29th year of the Republic of China, it actually obeyed Japan and, under the circumstances where all our sea ports had been lost, blockaded the only channel for my foreign transportation - the Yunnan-Burma Highway, for as long as three months. Looking back at the early days of the War of Resistance, we would often have to pay the price of tens of thousands of lives just to gain a little time. And now, they can casually strangle you to death. This kind of disregard for human life and kicking someone when they're down is something that only countries that loudly proclaim 'human rights' and 'reverence for peace' can do."

  "It can be seen from this that during that period, China's diplomatic situation was not just isolated, because we also suffered ruthless blows, harm and strangulation internationally. Today, we revisit the past not to revive old grievances or create new ones. We only hope that future generations will learn from the lessons of history, recognize the sorrow of national weakness, and see the true nature of international interactions in today's world. What we should remember is: originally, there was no equivalent word for 'righteousness' (as advocated by Confucianism) in Western dictionaries."

  This sentence can be said to be experience condensed from blood.

  Politics?

  "In such a bad situation, what we can do is only to work hard on internal affairs."

  Military?

  The First War Zone, part of Henan Province. Commander-in-chief: Hu Zongnan

  The Second War Zone, Shanxi and parts of Shaanxi. Commander-in-chief Yan Xishan.

  The Third War Zone: Jiangsu south of the Yangtze River, Anhui south of the Yangtze River, Zhejiang and Fujian. Commander-in-chief: Gu Zhutong

  The Fourth War Zone, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. Commander-in-chief Zhang Fakui

  The Fifth War Zone, Anhui West, Henan North, Hubei South. Commander-in-chief Li Zongren

  The Eighth War Zone: Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Guiyang. Commander-in-chief Zhu Shaoliang

  The Ninth War Zone, covering southern Hubei, Hunan and western Jiangxi. Commander-in-chief: Xue Yue

  Tenth War Zone, part of Shaanxi Province. Commander-in-chief Jiang Dingwen

  Xuzhou War Zone, northern Jiangsu and part of Shandong. Commander Yu Xuezhong

  Ji-Cha War Zone, part of Hebei and Chahar border region. Commander-in-chief: Lu Zhonglin

  Here, the Sixth War Zone and the Seventh War Zone are concealed.

  "There are no isolated events in history, because they are intertwined and follow one another. Entering the forest of history, for a phenomenon, if we cannot observe and measure it comprehensively, it may be that the true image is incomplete and vague, seeing only the trees but not the forest. If you intentionally take things out of context, then the entire history will be distorted as a result."

  Episode 20: "Mysterious Winds and Clouds"

  In the movie, it says: Because any stock that has fallen to the bottom will necessarily have a rebound as long as it doesn't collapse. If you are placed in a dead land and not die, then there is still a chance of survival. This was China's situation at the time.

  This was indeed the situation in China at that time. If it were a small country, it would have perished long ago. It is precisely because of China's vast territory and large population that Japan cannot swallow it whole, and China still has a chance to survive.

  The film mainly talks about two major events: the Changsha Fire and Wang Jingwei's betrayal of the country.

  A great fire in Changsha, over 2,000 citizens were swallowed up by flames while they slept.

  The Changsha Fire was a victim of the Nationalist Party's scorched earth policy.

  The initial intention of the scorched earth policy was good, but it must not be abused. To prevent supplies from falling into enemy hands, should we demolish military supplies and strategic materials that can benefit the enemy, or do we need to set fire to residents' houses and hospitals?

  There are two strategies to prevent supplies from falling into enemy hands: scorched earth tactics and clearing the countryside.

  The Kuomintang's scorched earth policy in the Nationalist-controlled areas was a wrong decision, but at that time many people supported it. After the Huayuankou dike burst, tens of millions of people wailed everywhere, yet they still did not reflect on their actions, leading to the great fire of Changsha. It's truly lamentable.

  On the other hand, in the enemy's rear control zone, we implemented the policy of storing grain among the people and clearing the walls. Mobilize the masses to transport cotton into the mountains, bury food underground, dismantle railway tracks and sleepers, and take them away for burial. This way, the war resources cannot be obtained by the enemy, but can also stabilize the hearts of the people, making it available for our use.

  If at that time, the government could disperse the people to the vast countryside and mobilize the people to bury copper, iron and other objects that might be used by the enemy, and use ceramic utensils instead; distribute food among the people for safekeeping, and teach them the technique of burial. The people would go all out to protect their property, why would they need to burn down the city?

  Scorched earth resistance is a double-edged sword, which can cause temporary difficulties for the enemy. However, for our side, it results in a large number of refugees and disrupts the recovery of productive forces, causing long-term harm.

  The Kuomintang's insistence on implementing a scorched earth policy is, at its root, due to their inability to fully trust the people and mobilize them. Although the Kuomintang loudly advocates for "total war," they are actually afraid of the people. In reality, this is a case of "loving the dragon but fearing its might."

  The top responsible person for the Changsha Great Fire has another version on the mainland.

  Chiang Kai-shek retreated from Wuhan to Hengyang and arrived in Changsha on November 7. At that time, Changsha had become the target of the Japanese army's southward advance along the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway. Chiang Kai-shek personally arranged for the withdrawal from Changsha and asked Zhang Zhizhong, Chairman of Hunan Province, "What will you do in Changsha when the enemy comes?"

  Chiang Kai-shek further instructed, "Anything that can be thought of, burn it all with fire. We cannot live here, nor can we let the enemy live here... Regardless of food or equipment, anything that cannot be taken away will be burned by fire. This is something that everyone must not forget." After Chiang Kai-shek left Changsha, on November 12th, Director Lin Wei of the Chairman's Guard Office called Zhang Zhongzhong to convey Chiang Kai-shek's decision to implement a "scorched earth policy" in Changsha.

  Soon, Zhang Zhizhong received another telegram from Chiang Kai-shek with a time limit of 1 hour to arrive. The telegram read: "If Changsha is lost, the whole city will be burned! Hope to make preparations before the event and don't miss it!"

  According to Chiang Kai-shek's instructions, Zhang Zhizhong arranged for the garrison commander of Changsha, Feng Yi, and the head of the Provincial Security Office, Xu Quan, to be in charge of the execution. Chairman Zhang said very clearly: "It is necessary to wait until our army withdraws from Xiangyin before issuing an order to start the action." Moreover, he also made detailed arrangements, saying that when starting the action, it was necessary to first issue an air raid warning to make residents take cover, and then start the action after issuing a second urgent warning.

  Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek's implementation of the "scorched earth policy" in Changsha was inappropriate, but it clearly stated that it would take action when "Changsha is lost". Zhang Zhizhong said that he would act only after the Xiangjiang defense line more than 70 kilometers north was breached, and after receiving air raid warnings and emergency reports. However, the Nationalist army's discipline and legal concept had always been very weak, and the specific executors did not seriously understand the specific time requirements of Chiang and Zhang's instructions.

  There is another version of the story about the death of Empress Dowager Cixi.

  During the Shanghai Massacre, Zhou Enlai was captured by troops under Bai Chongxi. However, Bai and several of his regimental commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy, where Zhou had been their instructor. When Bai went to interrogate him, he noticed that his subordinates looked nervous, but he pretended not to notice. He agreed to let them take Zhou away, allowing him to escape. This incident was later secretly reported to Chiang Kai-shek by Dai Li, causing Chiang to distrust Bai and transfer him to be garrison commander in Changsha.

  After the great fire in Changsha, Zhou Enlai was ordered by the government to investigate the true circumstances of the fire. In his report, Zhou Enlai strongly defended He Yingqin and handed over the original manuscript to Zhang Zhizhong for review. As a result, Zhou's defense had the opposite effect, prompting Chiang Kai-shek to decide to kill He Yingqin. Xu Kunlun and Wen Rongfu were wrongly executed as accomplices of He Yingqin.

  Episode 21: "The Beacon Fire Rises Again"

  The 22nd episode "Changsha Battle"

  Episode 23: "Striking in the Northern Wind"

  By the end of 1939, a comprehensive general offensive was launched. On the one hand, it was the confidence brought by the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Changsha, and on the other hand, it was also the result of the [**] generals who grew up in adverse environments fully understanding the current situation between the enemy and us.

  Battle of Kunlun Pass

  But the significance of this battle was by no means small, because it was the first time that our army had won a victory in a strong fortified position since the Battle of Songhu.

  Episode 24: "Breaking Through the Blockade Line"

  Episode 25: "Fire Fights in the Yangtze River"

  Jujube is suitable for battle. 37 divisions, 3 rì army corps and 2 brigades, about 100,000 people. The Military Commission instructed: to avoid the sharp edge of the rì army's attack, use small units to ambush and delay, and retreat to the mountains, then cut off their rear route to annihilate the enemy.

  With the strength of four army groups, surround the enemy in Zuoyang. On May 30th, the Japanese army finally broke out a bloody road to the south under heavy siege, but encountered Zhang Zizhong's troops at Huanglongdang and Fangjiacun. On May 8th, they met the enemy at Xinjie, advanced north on the 9th to Yushan, and launched an all-out attack on the 11th. After five days and nights of continuous fighting, until the 16th, General Zhang was hit by multiple bullets and sacrificed himself for the country! The 74th Division also shed its last drop of blood for the country near Shiguashop in Nanhuashan! (Was it the 3rd or 13th Division?) On June 14th, Yichang fell.

  On the mainland, Zhang Zizhong's loyalty and bravery have always been highly praised.

  In "Blood Forged China" about this battle records?

  Hosted by: Communist Youth League of China Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

  On May 1, 1940, the Japanese army's 13th division, with over 20 tanks and more than 40 aircraft, advanced north from Zhongxiang to attack the Chinese 33rd Army Corps. The defending troops utilized the terrain to engage in fierce battles with the enemy. By the 8th, the Japanese army had successively occupied Changshoudian, Tianjiaji, Fengle, Zhangjiaji, and Xinye. At this time, the 29th Army Corps launched a strong attack on the enemy's flank, while the 41st Army blocked the Japanese army's advance northward. In the Xinyang sector, part of the Japanese 3rd Division and 40th Division repelled Liu Zuming's 68th Army and one unit of Chi Fengcheng's 30th Army, capturing Minggang, Shizi Bridge, and Xiaolindian. By the 7th, they had also captured Tongbai and Tanghe County town, advancing towards Zaoyang.

  1. The Second Army Group and Li Xianzhou's 92nd Corps took separate routes to attack the enemy from the side and rear, recapturing Tanghe on the 8th and XinYe on the 9th. In the Suixian area, the enemy's 30th

  IX. On May 4, one of the brigades of the Sixth Division began to attack the positions of the Eleventh Army, and successively captured Gaocun and Anju. The main force of the Eleventh Army shifted to the vicinity of Zaoyang. At this time, the enemy on the front line of Tang County launched a large-scale attack, and surrounded us with tanks from both wings. At this point, the Zaoyang highway was cut off, and the Central [**] team broke out of the encirclement circle from Zaoyang, leaving the 173rd Division commander Zhong Yi to hold out against the enemy, covering the main force's retreat to the west bank of the Tangbai River. By the 8th, the Japanese army occupied Suizhengdian and Wujia Dian, and broke into Zaoyang, engaging in fierce battles with the 173rd Division. The division was outnumbered, but fought back while retreating, resisting at every step. Commander Zhong Yi and most of his men died heroically in Xinye County, while the main force safely retreated from the Japanese army's encirclement circle to the outside lines. On May 10, various routes of the Japanese army converged on the banks of the Tangbai River. At this time, the outer wing troops counter-attacked, pressing the Japanese army's left and right wings into the Zaoyang area, and counter-encircling a large part of the enemy in the Xiangdong plain area. The Fifth War Zone also shifted to an offensive posture, ordering

  2. The Thirty-first Army Group and the Ninety-second Division moved from north to south, the Thirtieth

  29th Army Group from south to north, 30th

  Ninth, the 75th Army attacked from west to east and sent the 94th Army out of the Han-Yi Road, deeply attacking the enemy's rear communication line in Jingshan, Zao City, Yingcheng, and Yunmeng. At the same time, the Seventh Army of the Hubei Eastern Guerrilla Force occupied various points on the Ping-Han Road such as Jigong Mountain, Lijiashan, and Liulin Station. By May 16th, the 31st Army Group captured Zaoyang. In this battle, more than 25,000 enemy soldiers were killed or wounded, over 60 artillery pieces were captured, over 2,000 horses, over 70 vehicles, over 400 cars, and countless other spoils of war. At that time, the commander-in-chief of the 33rd Army Group, Chang Zong-chang, led the headquarters' special task force and the main force of the 74th Division to rush to Nangua Dian to intercept the enemy who was annihilated and retreated. However, a large number of enemies turned back and counterattacked Zaoyang, and also counterattacked Zhang's interception force. Due to the weakness of his forces, Zhang's army suffered heavy casualties until he himself was seriously wounded and died in battle on May 17th. The Fifth War Zone troops withdrew to the west bank of the Tangbai River and gathered in the XinYe and Tanghe areas. After the Japanese reoccupied Zaoyang, they concentrated on the east bank of the Xiangjiang River, planning to attack Yichang. At this time, the Fourth Division was transferred from Northeast China to replace the defense forces east of the Xiangjiang River.

  Thirdly, the 39th Division crossed the river from Xiangyang and Yicheng respectively, fell into Xiangyang in early June, and then occupied Nanxiang.

  Six, the 13th Division then crossed the Xiang River from Ganxi and Shaxi on the Han-Yi Road, merged with the enemy advancing southward, and attacked the Central [**] team. They successively captured Jingmen and Jiangling, and forced their way to Yichang. The Nationalist army retreated westward in a disorganized manner, abandoning Yichang on the 14th day, shifting to an external defense posture, deploying troops north of Yichang, Dangyang, Suixian, and Zaoyang to monitor the enemy. In this battle, although the Japanese army occupied Yichang, they never captured the main force of the Central [**] team and failed to eliminate the threat to Wuhan from Xiangfan and the Dahongshan area. The campaign lasted nearly two months, with over 500 large and small battles fought. The Central [**] team achieved its goal of pinning down and depleting the enemy in this battle.

  Episode 26: "The Mysterious Mirror"

  English Translation:

  The background of Wang Jingwei's departure may not be simple, but his pessimism about the prospects of the war of resistance is obviously one of the important factors. To be honest, at that time, there were not just Wang Jingwei who thought so. Because from a scientific point of view, we really can't calculate what the decisive factor is! However, this factor does exist. The ancients said [when the times are exhausted, the integrity appears], where "integrity" refers to a kind of moral integrity. That is, the [national spirit] that we want to talk about today?

  In the face of this series of setbacks and a string of blows, the people made a resolute response: on September 6, 1940, Chongqing was declared the wartime capital.

  The film interprets [g?qìngjīng spirit] as a kind of spirit, an unyielding and indomitable spirit, and takes this spirit as the decisive factor for the Chinese nation to win.

  Unyielding and indomitable is indeed the spirit of our Chinese nation standing tall among the world's nations. But did the National Government under Mr. Chiang's leadership truly embody this spirit of our nation?

  The "Tung Work Plan" (November 1939) and the "Chien Work Plan" (November 1940), which were revealed after Japan's surrender, undoubtedly gave a negative answer. These two plans both occurred after Wang Jingwei had defected to the enemy. At the same time, they also confirmed that the Nationalist government's worries about Japan's invasion at that time were not unfounded or baseless.

  Correspondingly, [**] also publicized "Yan'an Spirit".

  What is Yan'an Spirit? The following is what the propaganda department says:

  The connotation of Yan'an spirit is very rich, it is the proletariat revolutionary spirit with self-reliance and arduous struggle as its core content, cultivated by Chinese Communists represented by [**] during the Yan'an period.

  The Yan'an spirit is a spiritual outlook, ideological character, moral sentiment and fine work style of the people during the Yan'an period, and also a unique spiritual civilization of the Chinese proletariat.

  The inherent essence of Yan'an spirit is the ideal and morality of [**], its ideological basis is seeking truth from facts, its most distinctive feature is the entrepreneurial spirit of self-reliance and hard struggle, while the lofty [**] ideal and faith are the soul of Yan'an spirit, running through it all the time.

  The Yan'an spirit is a spirit that bears in mind the motherland, thinks of the overall situation of the revolution, and serves the people wholeheartedly.

  Yan'an spirit is a spirit of integrity and selflessness, not seeking personal, family or narrow group interests.

  Yan'an spirit is a spirit of sharing weal and woe with the masses, of arduous struggle, and of self-reliant pioneering.

  In a letter to his cousin Wen Yunchang on November 27, 1937, he clearly and concisely reflected the revolutionary spirit of Yan'an. The letter pointed out: "Only by uniting and fighting together can we drive out imperialism and have a way out." Here, from the commander-in-chief down to the cooks, everyone is treated equally, because our party only works for the nation, the people, and the laboring masses, sacrificing personal interests, so everyone is equal, and there are no salaries.

  The most prominent spirit of Yan'an is the entrepreneurial spirit of arduous struggle. In Yan'an, people ate millet, lived in caves, and wore coarse cloth, with a very meager material life. However, tens of thousands of passionate young people, many of whom were from wealthy families, risked their lives to break through layers of blockade lines from luxurious cities like Shanghai and Beijing, and rushed to Yan'an. The fundamental reason was that Yan'an had truth, lofty ideals, strong national independence and the conviction of people's liberation, high moral sentiments, and new types of interpersonal relationships. In short, the spirit of Yan'an is a unique spiritual civilization of the Chinese proletariat.

  Episode 27: "Resource Development"

  Among many civilian supplies, food is still the most important. It is estimated that the rice production in 14 provinces in the rear accounted for 65% of the national total output before the war, and it should be enough to eat during the war. However, in the autumn of 1939, the price of rice soared by more than twice, which was partly related to the poor harvest that year, but the main reason was the psychological impact of uncertainty and insecurity brought about by the war on the people. Those who should sell did not sell, and those who should not buy also bought, resulting in [hoarding], which caused a serious imbalance between supply and demand in the market.

  In 1929, Zheng Fu adopted Shen Zonghan's suggestion and implemented the "land tax collection in kind" method. At the same time, for those with surplus grain, he implemented a "price-based procurement" policy.

  I don't know why, but this film doesn't mention the economic "control" policy during the War of Resistance. In fact, I personally have a high evaluation of this economic "control" policy, because it kept the army's morale from dispersing and maintained its combat effectiveness.

  But I also notice that the government is like a clumsy warrior, who while wielding the "dragon-slaying sword" to kill enemies, also cuts off pieces of his own flesh.

  Let's talk about the land tax collection in kind.

  What is the land tax collection in kind? The land tax (national agricultural tax) was originally collected in monetary form, but in 1940, the government did not want to collect its own fiat currency and changed it to collecting farm products (in kind).

  Why not collect French currency? It turns out that the French currency depreciated too quickly. Taking the purchasing power of 1 franc in 1937 as an example, by the end of 1938 it was equivalent to about 6 cents of pre-war currency, and by the end of 1939 it was only worth 2.8 cents of pre-war currency. By the end of 1940, it had fallen to around 8 cents, "and then continued to decline until the end of 1943 when it was only worth half a cent. By August 1945, just before Japan's surrender, it was equivalent to only 5 cents of pre-war French currency."

  In the 18th episode "Fenghuo Taoli Jie", Wang Zuorong recalled: At graduation, my diploma had a note that I owed zhèng?fǔ some money. I have paid back this money. However, by then it was already worthless. To what extent was it worthless? Suppose: In 1937, 10,000 legal tender could support 3 university students for one day and two meals for a year. By 1945, it could only support one person for one meal.

  The economic "control" and land tax collection were originally intended to prevent prices from soaring and stabilize supplies. During the war of resistance, it indeed guaranteed the supply of the army and government officials, playing a role in stabilizing morale.

  Whenever grain prices rise, they will inevitably stimulate the pressure for wage increases, and rising wages will lead to a general increase in animal prices, thereby triggering a vicious cycle of inflation. However, the government is not using land taxes to suppress commodity prices, but instead is pushing up inflation.

  In 1941, one yuan of agricultural tax was exchanged for two shi of rice, and in 1942 it became four shi of rice per yuan. At that time, a popular folk song circulating in the Kuomintang-controlled areas had the lyrics: "A stone of rice is worth ten thousand dollars, how can the official price be only two thousand?"

  In 1941, the Nationalist government proposed: "Apart from the actual collection of grain taxes, a separate price would be set for each province to purchase grain, and the quantity, standard, and price would be determined annually according to the needs of each province and the current grain prices. A portion of the payment would be made in cash, and another portion in grain coupons and savings certificates, which would be collected along with the land tax after the autumn harvest. The county-level public grain, which was previously allocated by the counties themselves, was also subject to a quota and would be collected together with the land tax. According to the Ministry of Food's report, this method was "close to allocation". The payment method was called "three-seven combination", where 30% would be paid in legal tender, and 70% in grain coupons or savings certificates. Grain coupons or savings certificates could not circulate in the market, in other words, they could not be used as production preparation funds for the following year.

  On the one hand, ultra-low price collection, on the other hand, deprivation of the second year's production preparation fund. As a result, the destruction of agricultural production is imaginable.

  The "three all" policy of grain collection, requisition and borrowing has seriously damaged the interests of farmers. The three-all policy is actually a policy of plundering farmers, through which the Nationalist government took away more than half of the crops from the hands of farmers. What was taken away was not only the surplus products of farmers but also a large part of the necessities for their own survival. In 1942, in Sichuan where the land tax was heavy, 59.5% of the grain yield per mu had to be taken away; in Hunan, the grain taken away accounted for 52.79% of the yield per mu; and in Yunnan, the grain taken away also accounted for 48% of the yield per mu. Through the three-all policy, the grain in rural areas was almost completely swept away. As a result, although the food supply for soldiers, public teachers and other non-agricultural population was guaranteed, laboring farmers had to suffer from hunger and starvation, and the vast majority of laboring farmers could only survive on coarse grains, wild vegetables and tree bark. Starvation became a common occurrence.

  The film says that the collection is carried out on households with surplus grain. Is this really the case? At that time, large and small landlords used the increase in land taxes as an excuse to extort more rent from peasants. In 1942, the Nationalist government's Executive Yuan issued a directive to all provinces stating: "If the land rent is not enough to pay the tax, it can be increased." If there are disputes or tenants refuse to pay rent, they can be sued in court. Openly encouraging the landlord class to change money rent to material rent and shift the burden of taxation to farmers who engage in actual production. (Modern Chinese Economic History, p. 501)

  Unreasonable land tax collection and procurement quotas led to the bankruptcy of a large number of self-cultivating farmers, with severe consequences for land annexation. At the same time, due to insufficient surplus grain, a large number of young and middle-aged people left their land to join the army (to get food), resulting in a significant reduction in agricultural production population. The number of people eating grain increased, while the number of people growing grain decreased, inevitably leading to an increase in land tax collection and procurement quotas in the second year.

  Why do I say that the government is pushing up inflation? The government buys at a low price ( unified procurement and sales policy) and sells at a price more than 8 times higher. Coupled with the decline in agricultural productivity, grain has become even scarcer, leading to soaring prices for livestock.

  At that time, the legal tender was the unified currency of the country. The inflation in the Nationalist-controlled areas simultaneously dealt a severe blow to the economy of the occupied territories (Wang Jingwei regime). At that time, the controlled zones were forced to issue border currencies in order to protect the economic stability of the border regions. We know that issuing currency is originally a national act, and the issuance of border currencies prompted [**] to begin considering the personnel needed for managing national-level zhèng?fǔ and start preparing for it.

  Personally, if there are two currencies, one of which devalues every day and the other is much more stable. Obviously, people prefer to accept a stable currency. Therefore, the border currency is widely used in North China, Shandong and other places.

  Let's take a look at how [**] stabilized its currency in the controlled area, also starting from food.

  To encourage grain production. In addition to economic measures such as opening up wasteland, migration, and water conservancy, the main thing is to implement rent and interest reduction. The specific method of rent and interest reduction is generally "two-five" rent reduction in terms of land rent. Regardless of public or private land, tenant farming, etc., and regardless of whether it is a monetary tax system, material rent system, living rent system, or dead rent system (iron plate rent), all are uniformly reduced by 25% based on the pre-war rent amount. If the masses want to reduce more, they can also be reduced by three-seven or four-six according to the situation. The policy of rent and interest reduction was formally proposed in August 1937, but it encountered obstruction from the landlords, who attempted to use self-cultivation, sale, division of property, etc. to threaten the peasants, or raise the rent amount to achieve the purpose of openly reducing while secretly not reducing. Therefore, the implementation of rent and interest reduction was not universally implemented in various liberated areas until 1942.

  Through rent and interest reduction, the rural class relations and land relations have undergone changes that are beneficial to the vast number of poor peasants. According to a survey of 15 villages in the Taihang region, after rent and interest reduction, the economic status of landlords and rich peasants significantly declined compared to before rent reduction. The proportion of land owned by landlords decreased from 23% in 1942 to 3.6% in 1944, and the average land ownership per household decreased from 98.6 mu to 42 mu. In contrast, the economic status of poor hired laborers significantly improved, with an increase in the average number of land owned by each household, and many rose to become middle peasants, leading to a significant increase in the number of middle peasant households, rising from 37.8% of total rural households in 1942 to 55.2% in 1944. The proportion of land owned by middle peasants also increased from 37% in 1942 to 60% in 1944. (Modern Chinese Economic History, p. 542)

  So, in 1946, when the Nationalist Party brandished its "Heavenly Sword" and "Dragon-Slaying Knife" to charge at [**], the dazzling armor inside was wrapped around a thin and gaunt figure, his flesh almost completely cut away by himself. In contrast, [**] had only three sections of staff in hand, but inside the rattan armor was a sturdy physique. Therefore, in the first year, [**] could only dodge left and right; in the second year, the Nationalist Party was panting; in the third year, the Nationalist Party could hardly even muster the strength to parry.

  So, although their reputation is not as loud as that of soldiers who have fought to the death on the battlefield. We can't even count how many warriors are fighting on the economic front line. But their contribution to the whole nation will be forever recorded in the annals of the War of Resistance against Japan.

  According to the records of rural surveys published by the National Government's Rural Revitalization Committee in several provinces around 1934, there were hundreds of types of rural donations and taxes in each province.

  According to the Tianjin Dagong Bao in 1932, there were 1,756 types of donations and taxes nationwide. For example, those who did not grow opium had a "lazy donation", while those who defecated had a "feces drowning donation". Those who got married had a "new marriage donation", the dead had a "coffin donation" (Fujian), sweeping the floor had a "garbage donation", as well as road tolls, transportation taxes, and other miscellaneous taxes. The forced cultivation of opium and heavy taxation on it were extremely cruel to the people. Local warlords competed with each other to force the cultivation of opium. Chiang Kai-shek loudly advocated for a ban on smoking in order to take control of the opium tax revenue, implemented a monopoly on opium sales, and armed the transportation and sale of opium to reap huge profits. The result of the ban was the invisible promotion of smoking. It is estimated that by 1932, there were 17 provinces growing opium, covering an area of 4 million mu, with an annual output of 200 million taels of opium, and tax revenue exceeding 343 million yuan. Other donations and taxes also continued to increase in number.

  For example, after 1928, especially after 1931, land prices and agricultural product prices plummeted. However, the amount of land tax collected continued to increase year by year. In Jiangsu's Wujiang County, from 1925 to 1932, it increased by more than double in just seven or eight years. The surtax on land tax, which was originally set at no more than 30% of the regular tax during Yuan Shikai's rule, exceeded 25 times the regular tax in Jiangsu's Haimen and Rugao counties in 1933. At the same time, some places also had to pay taxes in advance. In 1935, Sichuan's Daxian, Gongan, and Hainan counties had already collected taxes up to 1970-1981. According to statistics, from 1930 to 1933, Chiang Kai-shek's tax revenue accounted for 95% of the government's total income excluding debt repayment. In Chiang Kai-shek's tax revenue, tariffs, salt taxes, and unified taxes occupied an important position, with rapid growth in income, increasing from 259 million yuan in 1928 to 1.057 billion yuan in 1936. These three major sources of taxation were also used by the four big families and their accomplices to enrich themselves and wage civil war.

  The April issue of "Southeast Economy" published by the Third War Zone Economic Committee in 1941 said: "From the rear to the front, from southeast to northwest, there is a atmosphere of 'tycoons competing for land purchases'. The rural areas in the rear are not necessary to be cited, and those who care about newspapers can see it at a glance; even in the front line, such as Nanxian and Huarong on the west bank of Dongting Lake, buying land is very enthusiastic, and even people who collect commissions for transactions have become wealthy, which proves that the change of land ownership has increased sharply."

  The accelerated concentration of land in the Kuomintang-ruled areas was also revealed by officials of the Farmers' Bank of China: "Since the outbreak of the war, the original evil phenomena of the land system have been completely exposed... such as hoarding grain, concentrating land, suffering peasants, rising land prices... and with the influx of speculative capital into rural areas during wartime, the trend of concentration has become even more pronounced... Those who sell land are half-self-cultivating farmers, small self-cultivating farmers, and small landlords who cannot continue to operate due to the impact of the war economy; those who buy land are those who have made a fortune from the rise in grain prices, evil gentry, rich merchants, and privileged classes such as returning soldiers, politicians, and others. As a result, land is gradually becoming concentrated."

  In 1944, the Director of the Guangdong Provincial Land Administration Bureau, Gao Xin, acknowledged at a symposium of the Chinese Land Administration Association that; In the Dongjiang area, self-cultivating farmers with less than 5 mu of land have been unable to maintain their livelihoods due to rising living costs since the outbreak of the war against Japan, and have successively mortgaged or sold their land. Last year (1943), they even abandoned their land and fled in desperation... Now, large landlords occupying tens of thousands of mu of land are not in the minority in Guangdong. According to a typical survey of rural areas in Guilin, Guangxi, between 1936 and 1946, about 80% of tenant farmers sold their land, with 63% of this land being sold to new landlords and bureaucrats. Furthermore, according to an investigation by the Nationalist Party's Agricultural Production Promotion Committee in 1944 covering 11 provinces including Sichuan and Guangxi, and 114 counties, the proportion of tenant farmers and semi-tenant farmers increased from 57.7% in 1936 to 62% in 1944.

  It can also be explained from the survey report of the Sichuan Rural Economic Investigation Committee of the Farmers Bank of China in May 1941 and the administrative report of the Grain Department in the same year. The former report said: "The proportion of grain rent in Wanxian area, there are landlords who take nine and tenants who take one, there are landlords who take eight and tenants who take two, and there are landlords who take seven and tenants who take three. In the four districts, most of them are landlords who take seven and tenants who take three, roughly with landlords who take eight and tenants who take two being more universal".

  The Ministry of Food's administrative report stated: "Farmers' hard-earned income, most of which is given to the landlord, is the most unfair. In Sichuan, areas near Chengdu, due to the Dujiangyan irrigation system, the land is very fertile, and farmers pay up to 73% of their harvest as rent. Other areas are roughly around 60%. Recently, in the past seven or eight months, due to soaring grain prices, Sichuan landlords' income has increased by more than 10 to 20 times... As for the peasants, they earn very little, and some even have insufficient income to live on, which affects production and is not a trivial matter."

  Agricultural production is in a state of decline.

  Regarding the issue of funds, first and foremost, a large portion of the agricultural reproduction funds of middle and poor peasants are consumed by heavy rents and taxes. For example, an editorial in the Yunnan Daily on April 13, 1945 pointed out that after paying rent and taxes, the situation of peasants in counties near Kunming was: "In recent years, after autumn harvest, only less than half of the villages have surplus grain for a family to eat for half a year. After the Spring Festival, there are even fewer households with stored grain for three months' worth of food. During this period, various burdens that come with the times continue to emerge, forcing peasants to sell their stored grain. As a result, when it's time to plant, even sowing seeds becomes a problem, let alone having enough food and rice... From sowing to harvest, peasants lack capital - mainly food and fertilizer - and are forced to pre-sell their future crops at an even lower price than the current one." The heavy rent and taxes, combined with increased production costs and exploitation by usury, cause peasants to lose even more of their agricultural reproduction funds, becoming one of the main reasons for reduced agricultural production.

  According to a report by the Zhongyang News Agency on August 19, 1945: "Apart from extortion and blackmail by some military officers, as many as 840 out of every thousand newly recruited soldiers died from mistreatment." As a result, all able-bodied men in rural areas, including those who were over or under the age limit for military service, were unable to live and work in peace. Not only those who should have been exempt from military service but also many farmers who were supposed to be exempt often fled to avoid being caught because they feared having no guarantee of safety. They either went to cities or entered mountains and forests to temporarily escape. The result of the military draft was a severe shortage of labor for farmers. According to an investigation by the Agricultural Department of Sun Yat-sen University in 1941, which covered 19 villages in Lian County, Guangdong Province, among all men who left their villages, 38.7% went out to join the army. In those 19 villages, there were a total of 1256 men, including old men, and 501 of them had left their villages. Within just one year, the number of able-bodied men who left their villages accounted for 39.9% of the total.

  Anti-earth-based agricultural economic policy?

  First, open up wasteland and expand the cultivated land. Due to the destruction caused by the enemy and natural disasters, there are many wastelands in the liberated areas. For example, according to a survey in northwest Shanxi in 1940, the cultivated area was only 84% of what it was before the war. Another example is the great flood of 1939, which destroyed over 170,000 hectares of good farmland in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border region. In Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region, due to the siege by the Nationalist army and droughts and floods before 1937, the cultivated area shrank to 8431006 mu, which was only one-fifth of the total cultivable land in the entire border region. Therefore, opening up wasteland has become a very important measure for increasing agricultural production in the liberated areas.

  To enhance the enthusiasm of peasant masses in opening up and producing, various liberated areas issued preferential policies to encourage opening up. For example, the "Regulations on Preferential Treatment for Migrants and Refugees Opening Up Wasteland" in Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region stipulated: "The land ownership of public land opened up by migrants and refugees through self-reliance or hiring people shall belong to the migrants or refugees, and a registration certificate shall be issued by the county government. This public land opened up is exempt from paying public grain for 3 years, and private wasteland opened up is exempt from paying land rent for 3 years in accordance with the land rights regulations. After 3 years, it shall be handled according to the rental regulations, and the landlord shall not arbitrarily recover the land."

  For example, the "Opening of Wasteland Regulations" issued by the Shanxi-Chaha'er-Guihua Border Region Government stipulated: "Those who open up wasteland shall be exempt from paying public grain for 3 years and shall not pay land rent for 5 years; those who open up cultivated wasteland shall be exempt from paying public grain for 1 year and shall not pay land rent for 3 years; those who open up riverbank land shall be exempt from paying public grain for 5 years, and shall not pay land rent from the 5th to the 20th year. For example, in March and September 1942, the "Provisional Regulations on Reclamation of Wasteland in the Huaibei-Suwan Border Region" and the "Yanfu District Wasteland Reclamation Regulations" were promulgated, stipulating that poor peasants who opened up public wasteland for 3 years (Huaibei) or 5 years (Yanfu) would be exempt from paying taxes. Those who opened up private wasteland and became tenants would not pay land rent for 3 years and would have permanent tenancy rights. The reclamation work in various liberated areas achieved great success. In the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, from 1937 to 1942, about 3 million mu of wasteland were opened up, increasing grain production by 500,000 dan. In 1943, excluding government agencies and autumn reclamation, the total area of reclamation was 763,276.8 mu, and in 1944, excluding government agencies, the total area of reclamation reached 1,054,720 mu. During the 8 years of the Anti-Japanese War, the Shanxi-Chaha'er-Guihua Border Region opened up a total of 393,819.9 mu of virgin wasteland, 848,937.56 mu of cultivated wasteland, and 352,446.4 mu of riverbank land, as well as repairing terraced fields, improving alkaline soil, and destroying enemy-occupied canals, with a total area of over 2 million mu.

  Secondly, vigorously develop and repair water conservancy facilities for agriculture, expand irrigation areas. "Water conservancy is the lifeline of agriculture".

  The border area anti-Japanese democratic government regulations: "The newly cultivated land that has been transformed from dry land to irrigated land, 3 years are exempt from paying public grain." Jingbian in 1942 built 5000 mu of irrigated land. The whole border area in 1942 newly built 27572 mu of irrigated land.

  In the enemy's rear liberation zone, in order to encourage the masses to build water conservancy, each anti-Japanese democratic government also issued a water conservancy policy, thus, although the war was raging on, unprecedented achievements were made. For example, in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area during the eight years of resistance against Japan, 22425 wells were dug, 125190 mu of land were irrigated, 3961 new canals were opened, and 727060 mu of land were irrigated; 2798 old canals were renovated, and 304146 mu of land were irrigated. In addition to other water conservancy projects such as reservoirs and ponds, a total of 1265601 mu of land were irrigated.

  The achievements in water conservancy construction in the Central China liberation zone are outstanding. For example, in the Su-North Yangtze River Delta area, during the winter of 1943 and the spring of 1944, 50,000 people worked together to dredge the Mufeng, Tanyang, and Lübin rivers, among others, a total of 8 rivers, with a length of 80 li, an average width of 3 zhang, and a depth of 1.5 zhang, excavating over 230,000 cubic meters of soil, benefiting 145,000 mu of land.

  Third. Agricultural loans and support for various industries to support agriculture. In order to support agriculture, during the extremely difficult years of war, the people's government in the liberated areas provided as much support as possible for agricultural production, issuing large amounts of low-interest or interest-free loans and grain loans. To develop agricultural production and adjust rural finance. To make agricultural loans play a greater role.

  The "Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Agricultural Loan Regulations" stipulate that among the four types of agricultural loans - agricultural production, rural sideline production, agricultural supply and marketing, and farmland water conservancy - agricultural production loans are the main focus. These loans target diligent and impoverished peasants, while rural sideline loans target households with production conditions; supply and marketing loans generally target privately-run cooperatives to provide working capital for supplying rural necessities and transporting surplus agricultural products. Farmland water conservancy loans also require direct lending to peasants by the competent construction authorities. Those who fail to implement these regulations or divert funds for improper use shall be punished accordingly.

  These provisions indicate that the agricultural loans of the Anti-Japanese Base Areas are intended to support the development of agriculture and the national economy in the liberated areas. The interest rates on these loans are also low, with long-term annual interest at 1%, short-term monthly interest at 0.1%, and the possibility of requesting a reduction or exemption from repayment by the competent authorities in case of natural disasters or other unforeseen events.

  In Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, agricultural loans totaling over 990 million yuan were issued through the Construction Department and the Border Region Bank from 1942 to 1946. In Jinji-Lü-Yu Border Region, a total of 134.826 million yuan in agricultural loans was issued from 1940 to 1945.

  Fourth, improve agricultural technology and reward production and carry out the labor hero and model worker movement. Each liberated area issued specific decrees and policies to encourage land reclamation, water conservancy construction, cotton planting, livestock breeding, labor heroes, and technical inventions, etc. They also held grand production exhibitions and labor hero conferences. To increase productivity, we had to rely on technology and labor. At that time, in the backward rural areas, it was impossible not to rely more on strengthening labor efficiency and increasing the enthusiasm of the laboring masses.

  Fifth, labor adjustment. In addition to the mutual assistance in labor, industry and military assistance mentioned earlier, Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the liberated areas behind enemy lines also adopted measures such as rewarding immigrants, mobilizing women, mobilizing "second-streamers" to participate in production, and production holidays to help adjust labor. Regarding production holidays, [**] summarized the experience of Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region: "Some party and government personnel from poor families in the border region should be allowed to return home twice a year, each time for several days, to engage in family production. Primary and secondary schools in the border region must suspend classes during busy farming seasons, allowing students and local teachers to return home to help with production, which is also a way to adjust labor."

  The production self-sufficiency movement of the troops and organs in the liberated areas is an important strategic measure to persist in the War of Resistance and strive for victory. It was carried out under extremely difficult material conditions in the liberated areas. At that time, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the various liberated areas behind enemy lines were all located in vast rural areas with backward economies.

  "It is pointed out: 'Because it is a rural area, because it has been ravaged by the enemy for a long time, and because it has been a war-torn rural area for a long time, our troops and organizations must produce. Because of the dispersed guerrilla warfare, our troops and organizations can also produce. In our Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, due to the large proportion of troops and organization personnel compared to the local population, if we do not produce ourselves, we will starve; if we take too much from the people, the people will be unable to bear the burden, and the people will also starve. Therefore, we have decided to launch a large-scale production movement.' This production movement is 'a special product under special conditions at that time', 'completely reasonable and completely necessary'. The Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, this fighting force 'must serve two purposes, one side fights, the other side produces... Our army has these two skills, plus doing mass work, then we can overcome difficulties and defeat Japanese imperialism.'"

  In 1943, the total amount of self-sufficiency production in Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region accounted for 64% of the total fiscal expenditure, while the portion taken from the people only accounted for 36%. In 1944, the average proportion of total income to total expenditure of 15 directly affiliated units in the border region was 51.07%. The 21 directly affiliated units under the Central Committee produced a total value of 56650.58 dan (a unit of measurement) of millet, accounting for 77% of the total expenditure, excluding self-sufficiency. There was still a surplus of 13236 million yuan (border currency). The production performance of the troops was the best, with a total self-sufficient production of over 100,000 dan of fine grains that year. After deducting the portion used by themselves, 86982 dan were handed over to the Grain Bureau, including 63178 dan from the troops, 11982 dan from the border region system, and 11456 dan from the Central Committee system. Among the troops, the 359th Brigade had the best performance, producing a total of 20,000 dan of fine grains that year. After deducting their own consumption, they still handed over public grain to Zhengfu (the government), breaking the old tradition of "eating grain as soldiers" and establishing a new style of self-reliance and hard work.

  On November 29, 1943, at the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Labor Heroes Conference, he praised the self-sufficiency of production in the border region's troops and organs schools that year, saying: "The border region's military forces have achieved a great deal this year. Every soldier has an average of 18 mu of land, and almost everything they need is self-made or self-managed, including food, clothing, housing, meeting rooms, furniture, stationery, fuel, and so on... Our organs schools have also made significant progress this year, with only a small portion of expenses coming from allocations, while the vast majority is resolved through self-production; last year we were only 50% self-sufficient in vegetables, but this year we reached 100%; pig and sheep breeding has greatly increased meat production; and many workshops have been set up to produce daily necessities."

  The troops and organs in the liberated areas behind enemy lines have also achieved great success in production movements. For example, the North Yue Troops of Jin-Cha-Ji, according to incomplete statistics as of November 1944, operated on 61,756 mu of land, with a grain yield of over 150,000 dan. Early maturing crops, only two sub-districts and individual organs were counted, had already harvested over 790,000 catties. Vegetables, from May to July, yielded over 30 million catties, while other sideline productions and animal husbandry had earned a profit of 18.99 million yuan by mid-July. The Taihang Troops of Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu opened up 881,072 mu of wasteland that year, while the Taiyue Troops opened up 580,052 mu of land, producing 25,409 dan of grain and 4,031,360 catties of vegetables.

  In each liberated area, through rent and interest reduction, mutual assistance and cooperation, the peasants' enthusiasm for production was greatly stimulated, and agricultural labor productivity was improved. Agricultural production developed rapidly in the large-scale production movement. First, there was a significant increase in cultivated land and grain production. For example, in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, the cultivated land area had shrunk to 8.43 million mu before the war of resistance, but by 1945 it had increased to 15.21 million mu, an increase of 79.4%. Moreover, a large number of dry fields were converted into paddy fields, from 235,580 mu in 1940 to over 410,000 mu in 1944. The grain yield in the border region reached 1.84 million dan in 1943, with 162 million dan consumed that year and 200,000 dan left over. In 1944, it reached 2 million dan, not only no longer needing to purchase grain but also having surplus grain for export. There were also varying degrees of increase in other liberated areas behind enemy lines. For example, in the Jin-Cha-Ji Liberated Area, after eight years of water conservancy construction during the war of resistance, new paddy fields and irrigated fields reached 21,374,330 mu, with an estimated annual grain production increase of over 1 million dan. The Taihang and Taiyue areas of Jin-Sui and Jin-Ji-Cha expanded their cultivated land by 550,000, 300,000, and 225,000 mu respectively, increasing grain production by 160,000, 300,000, and 110,000 dan respectively.

  J. Becker, "Hitler's Germany" (New York: The Dial Press, 1941), p. 61

  Taihang area took in 2 million refugees from the Japanese-occupied zone and Nationalist-controlled areas in the last few years of the war, Taiyue took in 4 to 5 million. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power wrote:

  "One million famine refugees from Henan province crossed the Yellow River to enter the border region (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Border Region). It is estimated that more than half of the original households with ten mouths have died locally, and the survivors have entered [**] area in search of a living."

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