Motivation for Creation - Postscript Written in Advance 4

  Finally finished writing the story of the strategic defense phase of the Anti-Japanese War.

  When it comes to the War of Resistance, we can't help but mention Chairman Mao's classic work "On Protracted War". I strongly recommend readers who haven't read it yet to take a look. Don't think it's just a political work, this is a classic speech! Without saying more, when Chiang Kai-shek lost the mainland, he held over ten sessions of "Guerrilla Warfare behind Enemy Lines" training classes in Chengdu (which was actually the training class for the backbone of the large-scale banditry that occurred domestically after liberation), and one of the textbooks issued was this book.

  In comparison, the entire War of Resistance against Japan basically followed the course described in "On Protracted War". It is worth noting that Chairman Mao's work was a speech delivered at the Yan'an Symposium on Anti-Japanese War Research in late May 1938, on the first anniversary of the war. At that time, he probably did not expect the war to last for another seven years.

  "He who gains the hearts of the people will gain the whole realm" This ancient and profound saying is so simple and clear, yet so difficult to achieve! It can be said that throughout the War of Resistance, the attitudes of both the Nationalist and Communist parties towards the war have already laid the groundwork for the subsequent course of history.

  Why is the propaganda for the Nationalist Party army "negative" rather than "non-resistant"? And for the high-level leaders of the Nationalist Party, it's "non-resistant" rather than "negative"? Everyone can go and carefully savor the subtlety here. In my personal opinion, I think this conclusion is extremely insightful. Because throughout the entire war of resistance, from September 18, 1931 to August 15, 1945, our government at that time, its attitude towards Japan was to seek peace talks, such thinking can only be defined as "non-resistant", what else could it be? And in the face of the aggressor's attack, it was passive defense, such passivity can only be defined as "negative", what else could it be?

  We must acknowledge that throughout the War of Resistance, the officers and men of the Nationalist Army-led Central Army were truly fighting with their hearts. They used their flesh and blood to support China's last stronghold. They are heroes worthy of praise and tears, deserving of the title "Chinese", and we should forever remember these martyrs.

  But what about the upper class of citizens? Are they and the government officials of one mind?

  What about the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army then? Let's not mention the hardships of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, taking 1937 as an example. The Eighth Route Army (46,000 people) and the New Fourth Army (10,300 people), with only two army-level formations at that time, had less than 60,000 troops scattered into small units, deeply infiltrating enemy-occupied areas, mobilizing the masses, and taking the initiative to attack the enemy in a suitable manner. In the face of extremely harsh survival environments such as lack of supplies, they needed great courage and superior fighting skills to both preserve themselves and develop themselves.

  Proactive combat, harsh environment, superb fighting skills, rich theoretical knowledge, all demonstrate the superiority of [**] over the Kuomintang.

  The Chinese people like to look at the results when it comes to problems, and overseas Chinese also do so. In the past, Chen Jia-geng's proposal, which was praised as "the best proposal from ancient times to the present", "Enemy has not yet left the country, speak of peace and surrender immediately", was a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the Nationalist government's attitude towards resisting Japan.

  The people of mainland China, overseas Chinese, what did they see? It was the massive death of soldiers in exchange for a piece of lost territory; What about the people in the occupied areas? They saw the army abandoning them, the government abandoning them!

  At this time, [**] bravely stood out, went deep into the enemy's rear to carry out the struggle, and established an anti-Japanese base. The so-called "anti-Japanese base" is to establish a regime on the recovered national territory!

  What does this mean for the course of history after the victory of the War of Resistance?

  Xiao Yanliang and others, in the occupied areas, with a simple and ordinary person's perspective to resist the invaders, what they saw and did, their views, all along without any political sensitivity of an ordinary person.

  Having written this far, I found that my original writing thought has undergone a great change. Originally, I just wanted to write a story about a "knight-errant" type of character resisting the Japanese invaders, but it turns out that it is impossible to avoid the stupid actions of the Nationalist government's "those who are close are hurt and those who are far are happy" after entering the second and third stages of the war.

  People's hearts are changeable. I also can't avoid this issue, and the characters in my writing can't avoid the problems they have to face either. By 1941, Chiang Kai-shek should have already seen that history was gradually taking back the leadership and guidance of the entire Chinese anti-Japanese war from him and transferring it to [**]. I can even understand why he ordered the encirclement and suppression of the New Fourth Army in the "Anhui Incident", what a lonely and desperate move! What a crazy and ruthless act!

  Let's take a look at Chiang Kai-shek's summary after his defeat and retreat to Taiwan:

  Defeated and retreated to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek reflected on the reasons for his failure on the mainland. Chiang Kai-shek said: "We dispersed our troops in all directions during the attack, while the Communist army could concentrate its main force at any time, waiting for an opportunity to launch a surprise attack and defeat us one by one." Chiang Kai-shek believed that "we were not defeated by the Communist Party, but we defeated ourselves!" He summarized the reasons for his failure: ① Internally, we failed to unite sincerely, giving our opponents opportunities to divide and provoke. ② We violated the teachings of our founding father, with everyone pursuing personal gain rather than serving a greater purpose. ③ We lost the revolutionary party spirit, unable to contribute to the great cause with individual freedom and ability. ④ We lost national confidence, unaware of the greatness of national moral power and national spirit.

  Chiang Kai-shek reflected on his own army and summarized the seven major shortcomings of high-ranking generals: 1. Localism; 2. Overlordism; 3. Being superficial and careless; 4. Being vague and unclear, without seeking accuracy; 5. Being indecisive and hesitant; 6. Hesitating and wavering; 7. Being subjective and arrogant, rigidly adhering to one's own views.

  Chiang Kai-shek also summarized the Nationalist Party's laxity and corruption: the party could not unite as one, factions were divided, interests clashed, discipline was violated, and party virtues were ruined, resulting in the entire party becoming a loose sand.

  On August 5, 1949, the publication of the US "White Paper" enraged Chiang Kai-shek, as the White Paper devoted a considerable amount of space to criticizing Chiang's incompetence. US Secretary of State Acheson showed no regard for Chiang, attributing the Nationalist Party's defeat to "its leader being unable to adapt, its army losing morale, and its government not being supported by the people".

  So, my understanding of "responsibility for the War of Resistance" has two layers of meaning. First, in the face of aggression, do not yield, do not surrender, and resolutely fight back, even at the cost of one's life; second, to establish a rich, powerful, independent, and democratic country.

  Only in this way can it be considered a true sense of "responsibility" for Chinese people!

  As I write to this point, I suddenly wonder if this book should also come to an end. Standing from the perspective of an ordinary Chinese person at that time, I really don't know how to describe his emotions when facing the following situation:

  In early 1939, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Committee, Chiang Kai-shek said that the "bottom" of his "resistance to the end" was "to restore the original state before the July 7 Incident". And established the guideline of "dissolving communism, preventing communism, and restricting communism".

  In the early 1940s, the Wang Puppet Government was established.

  In August 1940, the Hundred Regiments Offensive of the Eighth Route Army began.

  The 1941 Southern Anhui Incident.

  In 1941, a formal declaration of war was made, and the main reason was not "invading China" but "offending a friendly country"!

  "China, a nation that loves peace, has been waging a sacred war of resistance against aggression for over four years. It was originally hoped that the aggressor would reflect on its mistakes after suffering actual punishment and turn back from its errors. During this period, all friendly nations have also been extremely patient, hoping that it would repent and allow the peace of the entire Pacific to be maintained. However, the aggressive and unrepentant enemy has not only failed to awaken but has instead become even more arrogant, launching a surprise attack on my friends Britain and the United States, expanding its war of aggression, and becoming the ringleader in destroying the peace and justice of all humanity, indulging in its insatiable ambition for expansion. All nations that respect their faith and obligations have found it unbearable to tolerate this any longer. Therefore, we formally declare war on the enemy, announcing to the world that all treaties, agreements, and contracts related to Sino-Japanese relations are hereby abolished."

  When the Eighth Route Army was engaged in a great production campaign, high-ranking officials of the Nationalist government were indulging in feasts and revelry.

  I don't know what kind of mood Xiao Yanliang and others were in at that time, but I know they absolutely wouldn't be satisfied with such a defeat! Maybe the victory of Kunlun Pass and the Expeditionary Army would bring them comfort, maybe General Zhang Zizhong's sacrifice would encourage them, but facing the great retreat of Yu Xiang Gui, how could they cry without tears?!

  Wait, wait.

  How am I supposed to continue writing? I don't know. I'm just an amateur author! Maybe it's because of this that the thought suddenly occurred to me that this book should end. Should I or shouldn't I end it? I'm very conflicted. For a whole day after finishing this chapter, I've been hesitating, and even when uploading the article, my emotions have been fluctuating unpredictably.

  From March 2002 to now, I have written 116 chapters and over 600,000 words in three years. I also feel quite tired. In the middle of it, I don't know how many times I wanted to end it, even quit, but every time a voice, a force encouraged me! Let me think about it, everyone. If there is no update on Monday next week, then I won't write anymore.

  Thank you for your support of this book.

  Written at the end of Chapter 116 of "Responsibility in War".

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