A One-Inch Square of Forged History (I)

  "Distorting History in 'A Foot of Mountain and River, A Foot of Blood'" [Reposted from Tiexue Forum]

  hcxy2000's words before reposting:

  It's a pity that due to certain reasons, there has already been debate in the book review about the contributions of the KMT and CPC during the War of Resistance. The author's point is very clear: among the people who resisted Japan, there were only Chinese people, only descendants of the Huaxia nation, with no distinction between political parties!

  To fight a war of resistance, it is necessary to strengthen oneself. With the chairman at the forefront, people seized the opportunity, and history and the people chose this person!

  Always remember, it is history and the people who choose **man!

  This article is what the author saw on Tiexue Forum. I agree with most of the views in it. These views can fully answer the questions that the KMT has been complaining about recently.

  For the above reasons, please be prepared to re-post about this debate content reader note. If your point of view has been refuted in this post, I will not hesitate to delete your book review.

  Once again, I agree with most of the views in this article, but not all.

  This article comes from Tiexue Forum, thanks to the re-poster Anyitian

  To be fair, the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression is a common victory for the Chinese nation. Both the KMT and the CPC made great contributions to this war and to the rise and fall of the Chinese nation.

  To the predecessors who sacrificed in that war, no matter which party or faction they belonged to, we must not make any disrespectful remarks. Because their blood and lives laid the foundation for today's China's revival.

  I opened this column just to correct the history that was ignored, distorted and even tampered with in "A Piece of Red Cloth".

  The preface of this collection says:

  We cannot ignore, distort or even falsify the past. We must face history with sincerity.

  This saying is very good, but it has not been put into practice.

  In the film, wherever there is ignorance, distortion or even tampering with the past, I will correct it one by one.

  Give me some time to finish it.

  The Story of Lugou Bridge

  Foreword:

  History

  It is the course of action for the life of human groups.

  No one can stand outside this ancient and ever-flowing river.

  But for now,

  History after all belongs to the past.

  So,

  We can go and create the future, forge the future.

  But cannot ignore, distort, and even tamper with the past.

  Because history is neither right nor wrong

  Whether you like it or not, it has become a fait accompli.

  Sincerely facing history can help us open our hearts and face the future with a broader vision.

  The Origins of the Sino-Japanese War

  This collection mainly tells: Starting from 1868, Japan was making efforts to reform and strengthen itself, while China was declining under the corrupt rule of the Qing government. The huge difference led to Japan's wolfish ambition to spy on China.

  The Third Set: "Early Republic Chaos"

  This refers to the Soviet Union instructing the Navy Bureau's Deputy Director Li Zilong to conspire and lure Chiang Kai-shek to Russia.

  However, Chen Gongbo recorded the twists and turns of this matter in "The Bitter Smile".

  The two people involved in this incident: Deng Zhi-long and Ouyang Ge were released without trial.

  Chen Gongbo asked Deng Zhi-long what was going on, and Deng said: "I received a call from Chiang Kai-shek's secretary to bring the Zhongshan warship into Guangzhou, and two days later it was called out again. I don't know what's going on either."

  Chen Gongbo asked Ou Yangge what was going on, and Ou Yangge said: It was the early morning of the 20th when he received an order from Chiang Kai-shek's deputy officer to immediately arrest Deng Zilong.

  Chiang Kai-shek took advantage of the situation to seize control of the navy from ** and also seized political power in Guangzhou from Wang Jingwei.

  The two people involved in the Zhongshan warship incident were released without trial. Therefore, there is no verifiable documentation available.

  However, in "The Chaos of the Early Republic", adopting the unproven theory of Chiang's faction is obviously not a serious and sincere confrontation with history, but rather a suspicion of tampering with history.

  Here is the translation:

  At this point, I just want to ask one question: Since Chiang Kai-shek has already captured the two individuals involved in the case, why didn't he make a transcript of their interrogation and determine which of Deng Zilong and Ouyang Ge was truly guilty? Or are they both innocent, and is the real culprit someone else?

  Ouyang Ge served as commander of the Jiangyin Defense Zone of the Navy during the War of Resistance.

  This collection also has the fault of concealing history!

  Chiang Kai-shek ordered the purge of the party and arrested ** people.

  But is it just an arrest? Why not tell the true history: thousands of people beheaded?! It's better to wrongly kill one thousand than to let one go!

  The film mentions the Northern Expedition Army's victory over Wu Peifu at Tingxia Bridge, but does not mention that this battle was fought by the vanguard team of the Northern Expedition led by Ye Ting. Instead, it is mentioned in episode 4 that Ye Ting led the Nanchang Uprising. Obviously, there is no fair display of history.

  The film mentions Chiang Kai-shek leading his army northward, dispatching troops to Jinan. They were ambushed by the Japanese army, and the National Government sent Cai Gongshi to negotiate, but he was killed in the May 3rd Massacre. Chiang Kai-shek endured humiliation and pain, taking a detour to march northward.

  However, in 1949, when the Communist army crossed the Yangtze River and entered Nanjing, a similar scene of imperialist powers interfering with China's internal affairs occurred.

  At that time, the British warship "Amethyst" was bombarding the Communist forces crossing the river, and the Communist forces also opened fire in response, hitting the British warship and forcing it to dock at Nanjing Wharf. The British warship took a passenger ship hostage before escaping from the Yangtze River.

  When faced with imperialist military intervention, the two parties and two armies adopted methods that were worlds apart.

  Who is China's new hope isn't very clear?

  Crisis and Opportunity

  Divided into three parts:

  The first part: Japan's invasion of China and its ambition to swallow up Northeast China gradually expanded.

  Part Two: The Chinese Civil War Continues, Chiang Kai-shek's "Recover the Exterior and First Pacify the Interior" Originates.

  Part Three: The 918 Incident, Japan's occupation of Northeast China and China's predicament in relying on international justice.

  "The Communist Party of China was founded in Shanghai in 1911. At the time, due to the small number of party members, it had to rely on the organization and strength of the Kuomintang to develop. Therefore, people like Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao asked Mr. Sun Yat-sen to join the Kuomintang as individuals. The Kuomintang originally intended to strengthen revolutionary forces and formally allowed communists to join in 1921. Unexpectedly, this buried the roots of endless internal troubles, and there was not a single day of peace. From the beginning, it was a way of relying on others for support. Therefore, they were very skilled at borrowing power, creating contradictions, and profiting from them."

  This statement is enough to prove that the KMT does not dare to face history and distort it. Is it because there are too few party members, so they must rely on the KMT's organization and strength to develop?

  Obviously, history cannot verify this statement. In 1927, due to the Nationalist Party's massacre, a large number of cadres were lost, especially those who emerged in the First Domestic Revolutionary War. After experiencing multiple sieges from 1927 on, yet it still developed, what is the reason? Can a simple sentence "relying on action" cover up everything?

  It is not because of relying on the line, but because the outline and policies put forward conform to the needs of the broad masses of laboring people, and have gained the support of the majority of the population, the peasants.

  Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and others joined the Nationalist Party as individuals, meaning they remained Communists and retained an independent political party. Why did Mr. Sun Yat-sen agree to this special condition?

  The Kuomintang was formed by the merger of several groups and had various factions within it from its inception. Especially after the Xinhai Revolution, people of all kinds flocked to the Kuomintang, but most were not true revolutionaries, and the party had a tendency towards rightism. The Communist Party, on the other hand, was a tightly organized left-wing party. Mr. Sun Yat-sen's introduction of the Communists into the Kuomintang was intended to balance the power within the party between the left, center, and right, while also reducing potential conflicts between China's two revolutionary parties. However, the 1927 purge led to a complete loss of trust between the two parties, causing them to become antagonistic towards each other. This also shattered Mr. Sun Yat-sen's hopes. The Kuomintang's current state is entirely due to the 1927 purge.

  "From the end of 1930 to July 1931, the Central Government launched three encirclement campaigns against **. In March 1932, Chairman Chiang resumed office and convened the Lushan Conference on June 15, where he reaffirmed the policy of 'first internal pacification, then external resistance' and formulated a guideline for exterminating communism."

  In 1931, the September 18th Incident occurred and Japan had already occupied China's three northeastern provinces. In June 1932, he did not dare to recover the lost land and insisted on fighting an internal war against the Communist Party. At that time, in Ruijin, the proposal to put aside past grievances and jointly resist Japan was put forward, but Mr. Chiang did not listen, truly having the spirit of "it is better to give it to the Japanese bandits than to lose a house slave".

  "At that time, the troops arriving in Yan'an were less than 10,000 people, but they and Zhang Xueliang's Northeastern Army from outside the pass produced a subtle chemical change. This change rewrote the history of the Chinese people."

  Can a single sentence "produced subtle chemical changes" cover up the fundamental cause of this major event that "rewrote Chinese history"?

  Episode 5: "The Change of Heaven and Earth"

  1927-1937: The Golden Decade of National Construction

  "Later, due to the Xi'an Incident, the entire situation became unbearable, and a battle that could not be fought had to be fought after all."

  In "The Cambridge History of China: Volume 12, Republican China, 1912-1949, Part 1" there is a chapter on the achievements of this period: The Achievements of the Nationalist Government. Here are some excerpts:

  By the end of 1936, Chiang Kai-shek had consolidated political control over a larger area of China than any leader since the revolution. Of China's eighteen provinces, only seven remained under basic autonomous control. This laid the foundation for a viable political system. However, the cost of this achievement was great. His reliance on military power not only caused significant loss of life and property but also diverted attention from much-needed social, economic, and political reforms.

  In 1934, the rice harvest was 34% below that of 1931; soybeans fell by almost 36%, and wheat by 7%. Cotton was the only major crop to exceed its 1931 level. The value of agricultural production in terms of Gross National Product declined from $24.3 billion in 1931 to $13.07 billion (at current prices) in 1934. These figures are not entirely reliable in detail, but contemporary eyewitness accounts confirm severe rural poverty, especially in 1934 and 1935.

  T'ien Hung-mao, in Government and Politics of China, 1927-1937, p. 168, writes: Chiang Kai-shek's evaluation in 1935 could reflect the general situation:

  "Government expenditures are increasing day by day. Every time a plan is made, new taxes are added. Additional taxes are often imposed on top of regular taxes, and various miscellaneous taxes are created. Sometimes, local authorities arbitrarily collect unclear taxes from each household. The tax categories are numerous, and the people's tax burden is heavy, causing them great suffering."

  "First, let's take a look at the domestic public opinion at that time. After the Japanese army occupied the four northeastern provinces, they attempted to extend their influence to North China. They first tried to win over Yin Rugeng and established the Hebei-Eastern Autonomous Government. On December 11, 1935, the Central Government established the Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs Committee, appointing Song Zheyuan as its chairman to counterbalance it, and authorized him to negotiate with the Japanese side. However, this move was misunderstood by some people, who thought that North China would follow in the footsteps of Northeast China. As a result, two university student movements broke out on December 9 and December 26. ... The student movement triggered a nationwide surge of anti-Japanese sentiment. ... This wave of protests had clearly gone beyond what the police could handle. This was just the end of 1935, and we already had a deep feeling that it would be difficult to drag things out any longer. In fact, this situation dragged on for another year. On December 9 of the following year, another street movement broke out on the anniversary of the student movement, which was only three days before the Xi'an Incident."

  Is this unbearable feeling coming from the Japanese invaders' gradual encroachment or from the people's anti-Japanese sentiment?

  "Looking again, ... but the one that was facing the Communist Army head-on was his own Northeastern Army. However, at this moment, the Northeastern Army had been worn down by the prolonged homesickness and their will to fight had been ground away."

  The Northeast Army did not lose its will to fight, but only wanted to die on the way home. They didn't understand why they had to fight to the death with the Red Army and were unwilling to die in a place they thought was not worth fighting for. After the disintegration of the Northeast Army, many soldiers joined the Eighth Route Army.

  On August 11, 1945, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, issued an order for the following troops to march into Northeast China:

  "In order to coordinate with the Soviet Red Army entering China to fight and prepare to accept the surrender of the Japanese-Manchurian puppet army, I command:"

  One: The former Northeast Army under Lü Zhengcao's command, from the current location of Shanxi and Suiyuan, advances towards Chahar and Rehe.

  Second, the original Northeast Army Zhang Xuesi's troops, from Hebei and Chahar, marched towards Rehe and Liaoning.

  Third, the original Northeast Army Wan Yi's troops, from Shandong and Hebei's current location, advance to Liaoning.

  Fourthly, Li Yun-chang's troops stationed on the borders of Hebei, Rehe and Liaoning will set out for Liaoning and Jilin today.

  The above four troops were the backbone of the Northeast Army, and they fought with the Japanese army in the enemy's rear for eight years, finally fighting back to their hometown. Has the combat will of the Northeast Army been worn out?

  "Looking at the battle of Ziluo Town in November 1935, (the two divisions of the Northeast Army's 57th Corps clashed with the Red Army's 15th Corps) in terms of combat effectiveness, the Red Army was far inferior. However, the two slogans "Songhua River" and "Unity against Japan", as well as the phrase "our own people do not fight our own people", thoroughly defeated the Northeast Army. This scene is exactly the same as Zhang Zifang's "Lamentation of Chu" on Jiuli Mountain."

  Here, we saw the power of political offensives and also saw where people's hearts were headed and where the military's heart was headed. Following their direction will lead to success, going against it will result in defeat.

  On the surface, it clearly says "[Chinese people don't hit Chinese people]", but "Yi Cun" altered it to "[One's own people don't hit one's own people]".

  It is necessary to know that the political striking force of [Chinese people don't hit Chinese people] must be much higher than [our own people don't hit our own people].

  "In the Battle of Ziluo Town, division commander Niu Yuanfeng, He Lizhong and his chief of staff Pei Huancai committed suicide. Two divisions had eight regimental commanders, six of whom also took their own lives, with only one escaping back, while another named Gao Fuyuan was captured by the Communist army. Along with more than 5,000 other captured officers and soldiers, they received "courtesy" and brainwashing from the Communist army. The content of the brainwashing did not include Marxist-Leninist ideology or class struggle, but only one sentence: "Unite to resist Japan and drive back to your old home!" These people later became the vanguard of the United Front in the Northeast Army after they were released."

  It's so well said!!!!! What Northeastern soldiers miss most in their hearts are their elderly parents and young children, day and night they yearn to return home! This is what the military and civilians are looking forward to. Any policy or action that conforms to national and ethnic interests is a tool for unifying the country, thinking what the people think, doing what the people want, this is being "unified" by the Communist Party. Anything that goes against what the people think, disregards what the people want, harms national and ethnic interests, is a **vanguard!

  It's a pity for those officers, the principle of obeying orders conflicted greatly with their desire to restore their country and avenge their families, under this heavy mental pressure, they could only choose to commit suicide to escape.

  The reason why the Xi'an Incident could be resolved peacefully is due to Chiang's analysis.

  At that time, Zhang Xueliang and others did not have the political energy to unite the nation for war resistance, while Mr. Chiang's position determined that he had such political energy. For the sake of national interests, it is necessary to abandon the idea of settling accounts with Chiang Kai-shek and advocate for a peaceful solution. This is similar to the Wuchang Uprising during the Xinhai Revolution, when there was a lack of leaders, and the insurgent soldiers forced Li Yuanhong to become their leader at gunpoint. At that time, Li Yuanhong had no intention of opposing the Qing dynasty, but he became the leader of the righteous army.

  Before the Xi'an Incident, it was recognized that the biggest crisis at present is "national subjugation", and the interests of the country and nation are to resist Japan and save the nation. As a result, the attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek has changed. See page 92 of "A History of Negotiations between the KMT and CPC".

  On April 9, 1936, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Zhang Wentian, who was in charge of the daily work of the Central Committee, from the front line of the "Eastern Expedition" in Shanxi. He pointed out: "At present, the order to overthrow Chiang should not be issued", "Our basic slogan is not the order to overthrow Chiang, but the order to resist Japan".

  On August 10, 1936, the Central Committee held an enlarged Politburo meeting to discuss the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the issue of a united front. The meeting decided: to abandon the slogan "resist Japan and oppose Chiang" and implement the policy of forcing Chiang to resist Japan, in order to push Chiang Kai-shek to ally with the Communists against Japan and make the National Government move towards the road of resisting Japan.

  September 11, the Central Secretariat issued an internal Party directive "Central Directive on Forcing Chiang to Resist Japan" pointing out:

  "The main enemy of the Chinese people at present is Japanese imperialism, so it is wrong to treat Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek on an equal footing. The slogan 'Resist Japan and Oppose Chiang' is also inappropriate."

  "In the conditions that Japanese imperialism continues its aggression and the national revolutionary movement throughout the country continues to develop, there is a possibility for the Central Army of the Kuomintang or the majority of it to participate in resisting Japan. Our general policy should be to compel Chiang to resist Japan."

  At the end of 1935, after Chiang Kai-shek negotiated with Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov, he actively sought contact with **. At this time, his trusted aide, Deng Wen-yi, a military attaché at the Nationalist government's embassy in the Soviet Union, submitted a summary of Wang Ming's speech at the Communist International "Seventh Congress", informing him of **'s policy on establishing an anti-Japanese united front. As a result, he immediately instructed Deng to quickly return to Moscow and make contact with Wang. ...Deng told Wang: Mr. Chiang saw your speech at the Communist International "Seventh Congress" and related articles, and decided to negotiate with **. Then, Deng proposed three conditions for the second cooperation between the Nationalists and Communists, as instructed by Chiang Kai-shek: (omitted)

  In January 1936, the Kuomintang sent a special envoy Dong Jianwu to Yan'an in secret. Zhang Xueliang was blocked in Xi'an and telegraphed Nanjing to verify his mission, then dispatched cavalry to escort him to the location of Wayaobao.

  According to Zhou Enlai's suggestion, Zhang Wentian and Peng Dehuai etc. after research, on March 4th sent a telegram to Bo Yibo and Dong Jianwu, expressing "willingness to start concrete and practical negotiations with the Nanjing authorities". And proposed the following negotiation conditions:

  "(1) Cease all internal strife, unite the armed forces of the whole nation, and concentrate on resisting Japan;"

  (2) Organize national defense government and Anti-Japanese Allied Army;

  (3) Allow the main force of the Red Army to quickly concentrate in Hebei and first defend against the Japanese invaders' advance;

  (4) Release political prisoners; allow people's political freedom.

  "(5) To carry out preliminary and necessary reforms in domestic politics and economy."

  This was the first time the Central Government proposed specific negotiation conditions for joint anti-Japanese resistance to the Nanjing authorities.

  Although Dong Jianwu's trip to Shaanxi was extremely confidential, it was still known by Yan Xishan. He telegrammed and questioned Song Ziwen, thinking that this was a joint attack by the Nanjing Communist Army on the Jin army.

  At the behest of Chiang, Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu also dispatched their trusted aide Zeng Yangfu to find a channel to contact him. In November 1935, Zeng found his old classmate from Tianjin's Peiyang University, Xian Xiaocen, and simply entrusted him with "establishing relations".

  August 27, 1936, Zhang Zihua arrived in Shaanbei with a letter from Zeng Yifu and the password for contacting the Nationalist Party's Wuhan radio station. On August 31, Zhou Sili replied to Zeng Yifu, stating: "I eagerly hope to conduct concrete negotiations with your responsible representative." At the same time, he proposed: "If you and Mr. Lifu can come to our place, we are willing to take full responsibility for ensuring your safety. If there is any inconvenience, Huayin's foothills can also be used as a meeting place. However, my personal safety outside requires your side to make arrangements." On September 1, he wrote another letter to Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, praising their efforts in uniting with the Communists against Japan. The letter read: "Mr. Huang came from Jinling and told me about Mr. Yifu's plan, which is exactly what you two gentlemen are advocating for... Our party has been calling for this for years, and now that you two gentlemen have taken the lead, our two parties can cooperate again, turning difficulties into opportunities." He hoped they would persuade Chiang Kai-shek to "take a step further, stop military actions, unite with Russia and the Communists, and jointly resist Japan".

  This is the origin of the letter that Zhou Silai gave to Chen Lifu in the film.

  On September 20, Zhang Zihua brought two handwritten letters from Zhou Enlai and rushed to Guangzhou, handing them over to Zeng Nianfu. On the 27th, Zeng Nianfu met with Zhang Zihua and said that representatives from Nanjing were afraid of drawing attention by going north, so they hoped Zhou Enlai could fly to Hong Kong or Guangzhou for talks. The next day, Zhang Zihua wired this information back to the Central Committee. On October 8, the Central Committee replied:

  (1) We must adhere to our national stance and immediately prepare for war of resistance; we absolutely cannot make any more concessions that would result in the loss of territorial sovereignty.

  (2) Immediately suspend the attack on the Red Army.

  After receiving the telegram, Zeng Yongfu immediately processed Zhou Enlai's passport for his trip to southern China and asked Zhang Zuohua to deliver it to northern Shaanxi. At the same time, he asked him to convey the following four-point commitment from the Nationalist Party: (1) The Soviet area can exist; (2) The Red Army will not change its name to the Allied Army, and its treatment will be the same as that of the **; (3) Representatives will openly participate in the National Congress; (4) People will be sent for concrete negotiations immediately.

  October 14, Zhang Zhizhong rushed to Xi'an and reported to Ye Jianying. The next day, Ye Jianying informed the Central Committee of these situations by telegram. The Central Committee believed that the Kuomintang had some sincerity in negotiations from these four points of promise, and also learned about Chiang Kai-shek's arrival in Xi'an on October 16. Therefore, they asked Zhang Zhizhong to negotiate with the Kuomintang and invited Chiang Kai-shek to send a plane to Yan'an to pick up Zhou Enlai to come to Xi'an for direct talks with Chiang. In fact, at this time, Chiang Kai-shek not only lacked sincerity in negotiations but also wanted to take the old road of "military annihilation" again, so the Zhou-Chiang talks were not realized.

  By the end of September, the Central Committee began to draft the "Draft Agreement on Anti-Japanese National Salvation between the KMT and CCP". In early October, the draft was formally formed. The draft elaborated on the necessity of cooperation between the two parties, as well as the steps, methods, and organizational forms of cooperation. In fact, it was the Central Committee's initial plan for negotiations with the KMT. On October 14, Pan Hannian arrived in Shanghai with this document and the aforementioned letter, and took up the post of Director of the "Shanghai Office". On October 22, a telegram was sent to Pan Hannian, informing him that Nanjing had agreed to his meeting with Chen Lifu. On November 7, a telegram was sent to Pan Hannian, notifying him to negotiate with Chen Lifu as a formal representative.

  On November 10, 1936, Pan Hannian and Chen Lifu, Zhang Chong held formal talks at the Shanghai Cangzhou Restaurant. The conditions of the Kuomintang were clearly "reorganization", Pan Hannian pointed out that his stance was cooperation, not "reorganization". The negotiations stalled.

  At the same time, the Central Committee did not have any illusions about Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. On the one hand, it made appropriate concessions and worked hard to promote the KMT-CPC negotiations; on the other hand, it decided to use military force to crush the KMT army's offensive and force Chiang Kai-shek back to the negotiating table. On November 18, 1936, the leaders of the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army issued a mobilization order for the decisive battle to crush Chiang Kai-shek's offensive. On the 21st, under Peng Dehuai's command, they won a major victory in the Battle of Mountain City Fortress, annihilating one entire brigade and two regiments of Hu Zongnan's troops. This crushed Chiang Kai-shek's arrogant plan to encircle and annihilate the Red Army in the northwest, playing an important role in promoting continued KMT-CPC negotiations and achieving domestic peace.

  November 16, 1936, Chen Lifu invited Pan Hannian to Nanjing for negotiations, but the negotiations were still unsuccessful. On November 22, Zhang Wentian sent a telegram to Pan Hannian reporting the Central Committee's strategy: "From all sides create a movement to stop attacking the Red Army, first ferment and then launch, one place launches and everywhere responds, thereby forcing Chiang to stop suppressing the Communists, this is currently the central key point of the anti-Japanese united front."

  On December 12, 1936, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng launched the "Xi'an Incident". On the day of the incident, Zhang and Yang jointly issued a telegram to the whole country, putting forward eight political proposals for resisting Japan and saving the nation:

  (1) Reorganize the Nanjing government and accommodate all parties to jointly take responsibility for national salvation.

  (2) Cease all civil strife;

  (3) Immediately release the patriotic leaders arrested in Shanghai;

  Release all political prisoners nationwide;

  (5) Launch a patriotic movement among the people;

  (6) Guarantee all political freedoms of assembly and association for the people

  (7) Indeed carried out the Premier's will;

  Immediately convene a national salvation conference.

  It fully shows that Zhang and Yang are for the future of the whole country and nation, requiring to stop the civil war and unite against foreign enemies. Only then did they have to launch this coup, "to make a final remonstrance to General Ji, ensure his safety, and urge him to reflect".

  To further study the guiding principles for handling the Xi'an Incident, **the Central Committee held a Politburo meeting on December 19.** At the meeting, it was emphasized that: "The current problem is mainly the anti-Japanese problem, not the problem of Chiang individually." "Our main goal is to eliminate internal war and prevent its prolongation." Zhang Wentian proposed at the meeting: "Our guiding principle should be to strive for national unity in resisting Japan, adhering to the principle of stopping internal war and uniting against Japan." "We should try our best to gain time and carry out peaceful mediation." In accordance with the spirit of the meeting, **the Central Committee issued a directive to the party on the same day, stating the basic guiding principles for resolving the Xi'an Incident:** "Firmly uphold the stance of stopping all internal wars and uniting against Japan, opposing new internal wars, and advocating for peaceful resolution between Nanjing and Xi'an on the basis of unity in resisting Japan."

  December 22, Soong Tzu-wen and Soong Mei-ling flew to Xi'an. Under the guidance of the Soong siblings, Chiang Kai-shek weighed the pros and cons and began to take a cooperative attitude. He entrusted the Soong siblings as his full representatives to negotiate with the Xi'an side and hinted that he was willing to reorganize the government, convene a national salvation conference within three months, reorganize the Kuomintang, and agree to unite with Russia and the Communist Party. At the same time, he proposed that for the agreed conditions, he would guarantee their implementation with his "leader's personality" without signing in writing.

  On the morning of December 23, Nanjing held formal negotiations with Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng and China's three parties. The representative of Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing was Soong Tse-ven. After the basic eight points were agreed upon, Zhou Enlai had a direct conversation with Chiang Kai-shek on the evening of the 24th. In "Selected Works of Zhou Enlai" page 73, there is the following record:

  Chiang Kai-shek made three points to Zhou Enlai:

  (1) Stop eliminating communists, unite with the Reds to resist Japan and unify China; accept their command.

  (2) By Song Ziwen, Soong Mei-ling and Zhang Xueliang fully representing him to settle everything;

  (3) After he returned to Nanjing, Zhou Enlai could go directly to negotiate.

  On December 28, 1936, the representative of the Central Committee issued a statement on Chiang Kai-shek's declaration, in response to Chiang Kai-shek's speech to Zhang Yang on December 26, announcing the conditions promised by Chiang Kai-shek. It demanded that Chiang Kai-shek practice his promise without discount and truly achieve "words must be believed, actions must be fruitful".

  January 8, 1937, the Central Government and the Soviet Central Government issued a telegram calling for an end to civil war, resolutely demanding that the Nanjing authorities immediately order a ceasefire, convene a national salvation conference, and achieve immediate domestic peace. The telegram pointed out:

  "Mr. Chiang should take a stand and stop the civil war that harms the country and its people from breaking out again... Because Mr. Chiang has guaranteed that China's civil war will not happen again, this incident is a major test of Mr. Chiang's political integrity and his motto 'words must be trustworthy, actions must be effective'."

  "On December 26, 1936, when the Chairman safely returned to Nanjing, the nationwide jubilation was moving. Since the Northern Expedition in 1926, Chairman Chiang had for the first time truly felt the shock of national unity! However, the established policy of [first pacifying the interior and then resisting foreign aggression] was changed as a result."

  Is this national jubilation due to Chairman Chiang's safe return to Nanjing? Or is it because Chiang accepted the proposal "Stop the civil war and unite against Japan"?

  Chiang Kai-shek felt the shock of national unity for the first time, what will this shock express? Obviously not [first stabilize the country and then expel the invaders], but "stop the civil war and unite to resist Japan".